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Navigable servitude is a doctrine in United States constitutional law that gives the federal government the right to regulate navigable waterways as an extension of the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the constitution. It is also sometimes called federal navigational servitude. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate "commerce . . . among the several states." In ''Gibbons v. Ogden'' (1824), the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously that this power extended to regulation over navigable waterways, which were an important hub of transportation in the early years of the Republic. Although the supreme court recognizes Federal control over navigable waterways is absolute. see Phillips Petrol v. Mississippi, 484 US 469,480 (1988). The public interest is not absolute. Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir.1995). The government has the power to reroute a waterway (South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876)); block a navigable creek (U.S. v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386(1945)); or completely de-water a river (United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913)), each without recourse by those who are adversely affected by the reduction in navigable capacity. One court has held that a federal agency can restrict individuals paddling on a stream, finding boating is not a 'federally protected right'. 8:09-2665-MGL 4th circuit (2013). This servitude does not extend beyond the navigable waterway. It does not extend to the banks of a navigable stream. ==''United States v. Rands''== An explanation of the rights of the United States in navigable waters may be found in ''United States v. Rands'',〔''United States v. Rands'', 389 U.S. 121 (1967)〕 The Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable waters. "The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States . . . . For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress."〔''Gilman v. Philadelphia,'' 3 Wall. 713, 724-725 (1866)〕 This power to regulate navigation confers upon the United States a "dominant servitude,"〔''FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.'', 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954)〕 which extends to the entire stream and the stream bed below ordinary high-water mark. The case continues: The navigational servitude of the United States does not extend beyond the high-water mark. Consequently, when fast lands are taken by the Government, just compensation must be paid. Fast lands are the lands located above the high-water mark. But "just as the navigational privilege permits the Government to reduce the value of riparian lands by denying the riparian owner access to the stream without compensation for his loss, . . . it also permits the Government to disregard the value arising from this same fact of riparian location in compensating the owner when fast lands are appropriated."〔''United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.'', 365 U.S. 624, 629 (1961)〕 It was held early "that the power to regulate commerce necessarily included power over navigation. To make its control effective the Congress may keep the 'navigable waters of the United States' open and free and provide by sanctions against any interference with the country's water assets. It may legislate to forbid or license dams in the waters;its power over improvements for navigation in rivers is 'absolute.'〔''United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.'', 311 U.S. 377 (1940)〕 The phrase "navigable servitude" wrongly implies the commerce clause powers over navigable waters are limited only to government activities that have a navigation purpose. In fact, the power is far more expansive than this. The Court stated in ''United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.'':〔 Under the ''Rands'' rule, when the federal government condemns land on or near a navigable waterway, it has no obligation to pay the full measure of just compensation to the landowner. Instead, it is permitted to exclude from the measure of just compensation any element of value attributable to the land's access or proximity to a navigable waterway. Congress responded to the Court's decision in ''Rands'' by enacting a statute, Section 111 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, which provides, as a matter of legislative grace, a right to compensation which the Supreme Court has declared that Congress is not constitutionally obligated to provide. Section 111 provides that the amount of just compensation paid to any landowner for land appropriated by the government must include any value attributable to the land's proximity to a navigable waterway. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Navigable servitude」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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